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LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE HIRING DECISION 
(OR "DO I REALLY HAVE TO HIRE THAT PERSON? ")  
I. · The Employment Contract In Tennessee 
A.  The relationship between an employee and an employer in Tennessee 
is a contractual one. 
B .  The Employment Contract 
1 .  The employer-employee relationship is the product of an agreement 
or series of agreements between the employer and employee, 
including but not limited to: 
a, The nature of the work to be performed; 
b, The duration of employment; 
c.  The terms and conditions of employment. 
(Hamby v.  Genesco, Inc. , 627 S . W . 2d 373) 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 198 1 ) ) .  
2 .  The Contract of Employment may be: 
a, Written. 
b. Implied from the conduct of the parties 
(Delzell v.  Pope ,  200 Tenn. 64 1 ,  294 S.W. 2d 690 (1956); 
Seals v.  Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463 , 327 S.W.2d 4 1  (1959 ) ) ,  
C .  The Problem of "Promises" Made in Employee Handbooks 
and Similar _Employee Guides 
1 .  An employee's handbook outlining a company's "Guaranteed 
Polices , Practices and Procedures" and providing that "the hand­
book is written so that each employee may know and get equal 
benefits from these policies that apply to all regardles� of 
age , race, color , religion , sex, handicap,  national origin or 
status as a veteran" was held to be a part of the employment 
contract in Hamby v.  Genesco, Inc. ,.627 S .W.2d ,  373 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1981 ) .  That case involved benefits payable to employees 
in a plant shut down, 
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2.  Some stste courts have gone even further, especially in cases 
involving job security. For example, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Toussaint v .  Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 
579, 292 N.W.2d 180 ( 1980) held that a personnel manual which 
stated that the disciplinary procedures it contained expressed 
the company's policy "To treat employees Blue Cross in a fair 
and consistent manner and to release employees only on just 
cause" was an employment contract not to release employees 
except for just cause. 
3 .  However, Tennessee has not gon� as far in this area. In 
Whittaker v.  Care-More, Inc. , 621  S.W.2d 395 ( Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1981)  a handbook which read 
an employee may reasonably expect uninterrupted 
employment year in and year out. An employee doing his 
work in a satisfactory manner and working for the good of 
the organization has little to fear about job security, 
was held by the Tennessee Court of Appeals not to constitute a 
job security contract, especially when read in connection with 
an employment application which provided that following a 
trial period of three months, the employee "may be terminated 
by either party at will upon two weeks notice to the other. " 
The Problem of Oral Statements Containing "Promises. "  
1 .  Oral statements by employers to employees regarding� 
security have even been held to be a jury question as to 
whether they are contractually binding in some states, 
including Kentucky (Shah v.  American Synthetic Rubber Corp. ,  
655 S . W . 2d 489 (Ky. 1983 ) )  and Alabama (Peters v .  Alabama 
Power Co. ,  S . 2d 1028 ( 1983) ) 
2 .  But Tennessee apparently has not gone as far as some other 
states in finding oral1promises for job security contractually 
binding. The Tennessee Court of Appeals in Savage v .  Spur 
Distributing Company, 33 Tenn. App. 27, 228 S .W . 2d 1 22 ( 1949) 
held that unless the employer's promise to employ the plain­
tiff for as long as he worked satisfactorily was met by the 
counter-promise to work for a certain period the employment 
contract was for an indefinite hiring. The U.S.  District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, applying Tennessee 
law, came to the same conclusion in denying a plaintiff' s 
claim that his employer was guilty of a breach of contract for 
terminating him after orally promising him he could work for 
the company until his retirement as long as he performed 
satisfactory work. (Marchant v.  Scheule Industries Inc. , 
572 F .  Supp. 155 ( 1983 • In Olmstead v.  Community Action 
Sources of Morgan County, 494 F. Supp . 699 ( 19 8 1 ) ,  a heads tart 
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) employee sued the CASMC under Sec. 1983 alleging that she was 
promised continual employment by the U . S .  Dept. of Health , 
Education and Welfare and the CASMC under an oral contract. The 
headstart program for which the plaintiff worked as a teachers 
aide was the Mountain Valley Economic Opportunity Authority. 
However, MVEOA transferred sponsorship of the headstart program to 
CASMC. The plaintiff's argument was that she was told that when 
sponsorship was transferred, the program staff was usually trans­
ferred intact; however, when the transfer was made, CASMC did not 
employ her. She claimed that the failure to rehire her by CASMC 
was due to her outspoken criticism of the headstart program 
administration. The U.S.  District Court held that there was no 
contract for employment. The statements were vague and general 
and not promises made to any individual, but merely represented an 
opinion, declared the Court. 
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11. State Employment Legislation Affecting Hiring 
A .  State Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
1 .  Tennessee Human Rights Statute ( T .C.A, 4-21-101 et seq . )  
a .  Makes it a discriminatory practice for an 
employer: 
( 1 )  To fail or refuse to hire or discharge any person or 
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with 
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment because of such individual's race, creed, 
color, religion, sex, age or national origin; 
(2)  To limit, segregate or classify an employee or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect the status of an employee, 
because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or 
national origin. (T.C.A.  4-21-40 l ( a)-(b) ) .  
b. Defines and restricts age discrimination 
( 1 )  The prohibition relating to age discrimination covers 
persons between the ages of 40 through 6 9 .  (T.C.A.  
4-21-407) 
(2)  Provides that it is not unlawful 
(a)  To discriminate on the basis of age where age is a 
BFOQ, or where the differentiation is is based on 
reasonable factors other than age. 
(b) To observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system 
or employee benefit plan, provided the benefit plan 
is not a subterfuge for age discrimination, except 
that no such benefit plan shall excuse the failure 
to hire a person or require or permit the involun­
tary retirement of any person ( with the exception 
of some policy-making executives who have certain 
attractive retirement benefits. )  ( T .C.A.  4-21-407) 
c.  Provides that it is not unlawful for an employer to discrimi­
nate on the basis of sex or religion where sex or religion are 
BFOQs. ( T .c.A.  4-21-406) 
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d .  Authorizes affirmative action programs to eliminate or reduce 
imbalances with respect to race, color, creed, religion, sex, 
age or national origin. ( T .C.A.  4-21-110) 
e. Defines "Employer" as including the state, or any political 
or civil subdivision thereof, and persons employing eight (8)  
or more persons within the state, or any person acting as an 
agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . (Note that 
definition could include all municipalities whether or not 
they employed eight or more people. )  ( T .C.A.  4-21-102) 
f. Establishes a Human Rights Commission. ( T .C.A.  4-21-20 1)  
( 1 )  Composed of fifteen ( 1 5) members appointed by the 
governor, five (5 )  from each grand division of the state, 
appointed for terms of six (6)  years. 
( 2 )  Has broad powers to investigate complaints of 
discr.imination, conciliate such complaints, or order a 
broad range of remedies, including the award of 
attorneys fees, and cooperate with the EEOC and other 
federal and state agencies to eliminate discrmination. 
( 3 )  Complaints o f  discrimination must be filed with the 
Commission within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory 
practice. (T.C.A.  4-21-302) . However, the 1 80 days 
statute of limitation does not apply if the complainant 
bypasses the Commission and takes his complaint direcly 
to chancery court. In Ho e v. Ro H .  Park Broadcastin 
of Tennessee, 673 S .W . 2d 157 1 984 the Tennessee Court 
of Appeals, Eastern Section, declared that there are 
three ways a person can file a complaint of 
discrmination: ( 1 )  Administratively, through the Human 
Rights Commission, which must be done within 1 80 days of 
the alleged discrimination; ( 2 )  Following the decision of 
the Human Right Commission, file a complaint with the 
chancery court to review the decision of the Commission; 
and ( 3 )  File a direct action in chancery court , to which 
the 1 80 day statute of limitations does not apply . This 
case involved an age discrmination complaint, the 
substance of which the Court decided alleged a federal 
civil rights complaint under the Federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act; therefore, said the 
Court, the one year state statute of limitations 
governing federal civil rights actions brought in state 
courts applied to the action. 
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2 .  Handicapped Discrimination (T.C.A.  8-50-103) 
a.  Prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing and other terms and 
conditions of employment by the State of Tennessee and its 
political subdivisions against any applicant based soley upon 
any physical, mental or visual handicap, unless the handicap 
to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the 
duties of the job applied for or impairs the performP.nce of 
the work involved. (T.C.A.  8-50-103) 
b. Prohibits discrimination in hiring against a person who uses a 
guide dog. (T.C.A.  8-50-103) 
c. Makes a violation of T .C.A.  8-50-103 a misdemeanor. In 
addition, the victim of discrimination is authorized to file a 
complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission. 
d.  Declares that the term "handicap" shall not include any 
disease or' condition which is infectious, contagious or 
similarly transmittable to other persons. 
3 .  Discrimination against non-resident local government employees 
prohibited. T.C.A.  8-50-107 provides that notwithstanding any 
public law, private act or municipal charter to the contrary, no 
person presently employed by any municipality, county or metropo­
litan government shall be discharged or penalized solely on the 
basis of non-residence in such local government. (Does not apply 
to Davidson or Knox County. )  
a .  continuing residency requirements are apparently 
to policemen, firemen and similar personnel 
v.  Philadel hia Civil Service Commission 424 U . S .  
, and are probably legal as to other classes of 
municipal employees ( Ector v. City of Torrance, 1 0  Cal . 3d 129, 
514 P . 2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 ( 1973), cert. denied, 4 15 
u.s. 935 ( 1974 ) ) , as long as they are not paid with federal 
funds . 
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III. Principal Federal Laws Affecting Hiring 
A .  Civil Rights Act of 1964 
1. Title VI--Prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or 
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance. (sec. 601) 
2 .  Title VII--The most significant of the federal laws establishing 
employee civil rights in both the public and private sectors. 
a. The core provision makes it an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to: 
(1) Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation , terms , conditions , or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
�··
color, religion , �· or national origin; or 
(2) Limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or ·tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. (sec. 703) 
b. Coverage 
(1) A 1972 amendment to this Civil Rights Act of 1 964 
expanded the definition of "employer" to include state 
and local governments , governmental agencies and 
political subdivisions. 
(2) To be subject to Title VII as an employer the government, 
governmental agency or political sub-division must have 
"fifteen or more e'mployees for each working day in each 
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year • • • • " (sec. 701) A 
government meeting that requirement is subject to Title 
VII for two calendar years. 
c.  Exemptions and Limitations on Coverage 
(1) An employee under Title VII does not include 
(a) Any person elected to public office 
(b) Any person chosen by an elected official to be on 
that official's personal stsff 
3-.1 
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(c) -_ An appointee on the policy-making level or an 
immediate advisor with respect to the exercises of 
the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
But these exceptions do not include persons subject of 
the civil service laws of ·a state, governmental agency or 
political subdivision (sec. -20 1) , and are otherwise 
to receive a very narrow construction to avoid dimi­
nishing the overall coverage of state and local govern­
ment employees according to the legislative history of 
the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1 964. 
( 2) Title VII also provides that it is� an unlawful 
practice for an employer to "hire and employ employees 
• , • on the basis of his religion, sex or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, �· � 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise. "  (sec. 703) (But 
the bona fide occu ational ualif ication exce tion-;fOes 
not apply to iscrimination based on race or color. This 
provision has been given extremely narrow construction by 
both the EEOC and the courts. 
d.  It is not an unlawful practice for an employer under Title VII 
to establish different standards of compensation or different 
terms , conditions and privileges of employment under the 
following: 
( 1 )  A bona fide seniority system; 
(2) A bona fide merit system; 
(3) A system which increases earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or 
' 
(4) To employees who work in different locations. 
But none of the differences must arise from an intent to 
discriminate on the basis of race , color, religion, sex or 
national origin. (sec. 703) 
e. Sex-based wage differences based on nearly identical 
exceptions under the Equal Pay Act are also expressly 
authorized under Title VII . (sec. 703) 
B. Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1 963 
1 .  Amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by making it an 
unlawful practice for an employer to: 
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2. 
discriminate • • • on the basis of sex by paying wages to 
employees • • • at a rate less that't"he rate he pays wages to 
employees of the opposite sex • • •  for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions • • • (sec. 3) 
Coverage 
a. A 1 974 amendment to the EPA expanded the term "employee" to 
mean state and local workers employed in public agencies, 
hospitals , institutions and schools , which obviously covers 
virtually all state and local employees. 
b. The EPA is a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, 
it is administered by the EEOC . 
c.  In 1 976 , the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v.  
Usery, 426 U . S . 833 (1976) , declared unconstitutional the 
application of FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions to 
state and local governments (Usery was expressly overruled in 
Garcia v.  San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al, 
�- U . S .  � (1985) ). However, Usery did not affect the 
application of the EPA to state and local governments. 
3 .  Exemptions and Limitations on Coverage 
a. The EPA applies only to sex-based wage discrimination. In 
other words , the only thing that will trigger an EPA violation 
is a wage differential between the sexes in a workplace. It 
does not apply to any other form of sex discrimination, to 
discrimination in hiring , promotion, discipline , firing based 
on race, color, religion, national origin .or any other factor. 
b. Some wage differentials are specifically legal under the EPA. 
Those paid pursuant to 
(1) A seniority system; 
(2) A merit system; 
(3) A system which measures earnings by quality or quantity 
of production; or 
(4) Any other factor other than sex. 
c. Title VII provides that any wage differential permitted under 
the EPA will not constitute a violation of Title VII . 
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C .  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
1. Makes it unlawful for an employer to: 
a .  Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms , conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's age; 
b. Limit, segregate , or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's age; or 
c .  Reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with 
this Act. (sec. 4 )  
2 .  Coverage 
a.  By a 1986 amendment to the Act, it covers all persons over the 
age of 40 and effectively eliminates mandatory retirement 
ages. However , the 1986 amendment also exempts firefighters, 
police officers and prison guards until 1994. Until then 
municipalities may determine the maximum hiring age and man­
datory retirement age for such persons , provided that the 
limits cannot be any more restrictive than those in effect on 
March 3 ,  1983 (the day the U . S .  Supreme Court decided EEOC v .  
Wyoming , 460 U . S .  226 (1 983) which held that the application 
of the ADEA to state and local governments was constitutional) . 
The 1986 amendment also provided that a study was to be 
completed within seven years by the Secretary of Labor and the 
EEOC to determine if physical and mental fitness tests are 
valid measurements of the ability of public safety officers to 
perform their jobs, and that within five years the EEOC is 
supposed to develop guidelines for the use of physical and 
mental fitness tests, 
b. The ADEA applies to all "employers" having twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 
(sec. 1 1 )  
c .  A 1 974 amendment to the ADEA defined "employer" to include "a 
State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or 
instrument of a State or a political subdivision of a State 
• • •  , " (which includes state and local governments) . 
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d. The constitutionality of the application of the ADEA to state 
and local governments was upheld by the U . S .  Supreme Court in 
EEOC v .  Wyoming, (460 U . S .  226 (1983) ) 
3 .  Exceptions and Limitations on Coverage 
a. An employee does not include the following persons for the 
purpose of the ADEA: 
(1)  Any person elected to public office; 
(2) Any person chosen by an elected official to be on that 
official's personal staff; 
(3)  An appointee on the policy-making level or an immediate 
advisor with respect to the exercise of the 
constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
b. However , the exemption does not include persons subject to 
civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency , 
or political subdivision. (sec. 1 1 )  
D.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1 986 (IRCA) 
1 .  Makes it unlawful for an employer to 
a .  Recruit , hire , employ or continue to employ , illegal 
immigrants , and establishes an elaborate system of employee 
identification and eligibility 
b. Prohibits employment discrimination based not only upon 
national origin but also upon citizenship 
2 .  Coverage 
a .  Employment verification provisions: All employees, public and 
private, regardless of size 
b. Employment anti-discrimination provisions: 
( 1 )  All employers of over three (3 ) people (except that all 
things being equal among applicants for a job, the 
employer can "prefer" the U . S .  citizen over the foreign 
applicant. )  (But see cautionary note below . )  
(a) Employers of 3-15 employees: prohibited from 
employment discrimination based on national origin 
� citizenship 
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(b) Employers of 15 and more employees: prohibited 
.. from employment discrimination based on citizenship 
(c) CAUTION: National origin discrimination by 
employers of over 1 5  employees is prohibited by 
Title VII. 
PROBLEM: Is the IRCA-authotized "preference" for a 
u.s. citizen, all other things being equal (which 
they seldom are) national origin discrimination pro­
hibited under Title VII? That is the position taken 
by the EEOC. 
(2) Covers U. S. citizens, refugees, asylees, permanent resi­
dent aliens, and legalized aliens who have filed notice 
of intent to become U.S. citizens 
3. Standard of proof of discrimination 
The ICRA requires the plaintiff to show "discriminatory intent" on 
the part of the employer; in theory, a showing of disparate 
impact will not suffice. However, the reality is that the Justice 
Department regulations provide that direct or circumstantial evi­
dence, including statistical evidence, will-ile permitted to show 
that an employer is guilty of a "pattern or practice of knowing 
and intentional discrimination. (Emphasis mine) 
4. The verification system. (See Richard L. Stokes, MTAS Technical 
Bulletin No. 7 ,  November 1 6 ,  1987) 
5 .  Anti-discrimination enforcement is the responsibility of the U. S. 
Justice Department. 
D. Civil Rights Acts of 1 866, 1870 and 1 8 7 1. 
Several important provisions of the United States Code stem from the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1 870 and 1871  and are commonly referred to 
by their section number: 
1.  Sec. 1981. Equal rights under the law. All persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of 
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other. 
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2 .  Sec. 1982.  Property Rights. All citizens of the United States 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory , as is 
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,  purchase, lease, 
sell, hold , and convey real and personal property. 
3. Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person 
who , under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage , of any State and Territory , subjects , or causes to be 
subjected , any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights , 
privileges , or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law , suit in 
equity , or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes 
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia. 
E .  U . S .  Constitution 
1 .  First Amendme�t (1791)  Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
2 .  Fifth Amendment (179 1 )  (Due Process Clause) No person shall be 
held to answer for a capital , or otherwise infamous crime , unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury , except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces ,  or in the Militia , when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself , nor be deprived of life , liberty, or 
property ,  without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
3. I Thirteenth Amendment (1865) Sec. 1 .  Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States , or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2 .  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
4 .  Fourteenth Amendment (1868) Sec, 1 .  All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof , are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
) 
) 
IV. Advertising and Interviewing, Etc. 
A .  Advertising the Job 
1. The EEOC dislikes both word-of-mouth advertising and a reliance 
upon walk-in applicants, particularly where the present work force 
is predominately white. In finding a company guilty of violating 
Title VII for recruiting through a word-of-mouth system that 
reached only· the white community, it declared 
a word-of-mouth recruitment policy conducted by a virtually 
all-white work force, without supplementary and simultaneous 
recruitment in the minority-groups' community (by means of 
newspaper-advertising and the like), constitutes a prims facie 
violation of Title VII. (EEOC Decision, June 4 ,  1969) 
2 .  The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines make it a violation of 
Title VII for help wanted advertisements to express a preference, 
limitation -0r ·specification based on sex unless sex is a bona fide 
occupational q�alification. (Sec. 1604. 5 )  
3 .  The EEOC interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act Guidelines prohibits age limitation language and such terms as 
recent college graduates, "young," "boy," "girl," etc. in job 
advertisements except when age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification. (Sec. 1625 . 4 )  
B .  Pre-employment Applications and Interviews 
This is one of the most difficult areas of employment law. A writer 
who analyzed the employment application of all 50 state governments 
concluded that everyone of them contained "inappropriate" questions. 
She defined "inappropriate" as being not clearly job related, those 
with potentially discriminatory effects and those that could not 
possibly be justified under the cloak of business necessity. (Debra 
D. Burrington, "A Review of State Government Application Forms For 
Suspect Ques.tions," Public Personnel Management Journal, May, 1982, 
p. 55-60) . But that conclusion is not so shocking; it is nearly 
impossible to frame any written question that cannot be used for a 
discriminatory purpose. The framing of oral questions without 
"inappropriate" language is even more difficult. 
1 .  Legally offensive questions 
a. On page 4-2 is the list of inappropriate pre-employment 
inquiries found by Burrington. 
b. On pages 4-3 through 4-B are samples of pre-employment 
questions which have led to problems with EEOC or the courts 
and which may be used as a guide for planning legally inoffen­
sive questions. 
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Inappropriate Pre-Employment Inquiries Made by the 50 States. 
No. % 
1 .  Are you known or have you been known by any other 
name(s) ?  
· 
2 .  Which title do you prefer? Mr. , Mrs. , Miss, or Ms. ? 
3 .  What is your birthdate? (With EEO disclaimer) 
4. What is your birthdate? (Without EEO disclaimer) 
5 .  What is your birthplace? (Without EEO disclaimer) 
6 .  What was your age on your last birthday? 
(With EEO disclaimer) 
4 
5 
16 
23 
2 
12 
8% 
10% 
32% 
46% 
4% 
24% 
7 .  What was your age on your last birthday? 4 8% 
(Without EEO disclaimer) 
8 .  What is your sex? (With EEO disclaimer) 37 74% 
9 .  What is your sex? (Without EEO disclaimer) 7 1 4% 
10. What is your race or ethnic group? 35 70% 
(With EEO disclaimer) 
1 1 .  What is your race or ethnic group? 4 56% 
(Without EEO disclaimer) 
12.  Do you have any handicaps or physical defects? 28 56% 
(With EEO disclaimer) 
1 3 .  Do you have any handicaps or physical defects. 7 1 4% 
(Without EEO disclaimer) 
14.  What is your marital status? (With EEO disclaimer) 3 6% 
15. What is your marital status? (Without EEO disclaimer) 3 6%  
16.  How many dependents do you have? 1 2% 
1 7 .  What is your height and weight? 4 8% 
18.  What are the dates of your education and/or degrees? 47 94% 
19.  Have you ever been convicted of a crime? 20 40% 
20. Do you possess a valid driver's license? 24 48% 
2 1 .  Do you have transportation to work? 5 10% 
22. What were the dates of your military service? 22 44% 
23. What was your rank when you left military service? 5 10% 
24. If claiming veteran' s preference, have you submitted 27 54% 
the appropriate documentation? 
25. Do you read ·and write English? 2 4% 
26. What is the lowest pay you will accept? 12 24% 
27.  Do you have any relatives employed by the State? 7 14% 
28. Are you willing to travel? 8 1 6% 
29 . Are you willing to work shifts/overtime? 5 10% 
30. Are you willing to lift heavy weights? 1 2% 
Note: EEO survey detachable from application 
EEO survey on separate sheet 
Source: Debra D.  Burrington , "A Review of State Government 
Application Forms for Suspect Questions," Public Personnel 
Management Journal, May 1982. 
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SUBJECT 
NAME 
MARITAL 
AND 
FAMILY 
STATUS 
AGE 
LAWFUL INQUIRIES 
"Have you worked for this com­
pany under a different name? 
"Is any additional informstion 
relative to change of name, 
use of an assumed name or 
nickname necessary to enable a 
check on your work and 
educational record? If yes, 
explain. "  
Whether applicant can meet 
specified work schedules or 
has activities, commitments or 
responsibilities that may 
hinder the meeting of work 
attendance requ1reinents. 
Inquiries as to a duration of 
stay on job or anticipated 
absences which are made to 
males and females alike. 
If a minor, require proof of 
age in the form of a work 
permit or a certificate of 
age. Require proof of age by 
birth certificate after being 
hired. Inquiry as to whether 
or not the applicant meets the 
minimum age requirements as 
set by law and requirements 
that upon hire proof of age 
must be submitted in the form 
of a birth certificate or 
other forms of proof of age. 
If age is a legal requirement: 
"If hired , can you furnish 
proof of age?" or statement 
that hire is subject to 
verification of age. Inquiry 
as to whether or not an 
applicant is younger than the 
employer's regular retirement 
age. 
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UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES 
Inquiries about the name which 
would indicate applicant's 
lineage;· ancestry, national ori­
gin or descent. Inquiry into 
previous name of applicant 
where is has been changed by 
court order or otherwise. 
Indicate: Miss, Mrs. , or Ms. 
Any inquiry indicating whether 
an applicant is married, single, 
divorced, engaged, etc. Number 
and age of children. 
Information on child-care 
arrangements. 
Any question concerning 
pregnancy. 
Any such question which directly 
or indirectly results in limit­
ation of job opportunity in any 
way. 
Requirements that applicants 
state age or date of birth. 
Requirement that applicant pro­
duce proof of age in the form of 
a birth certificate or baptismal 
record. 
The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 forbids 
discrimination against persons 
over the age of 40. 
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SUBJECT LAWFUL INQUIRIES 
HANDICAPS For employers subject to the 
provisions of the Rehabili­
tation Act of 197 3 ,  applicants 
may be "invited" to indicate 
how and to what extent they 
RACE OR 
COLOR 
are handicapped. The employer 
must indicate to applicants 
that: 1. compliance with the 
invitation is voluntary; 2 .  
the information is being sought 
only to remedy discrimination 
or provide opportunities for the 
handicapped; 3.  the infor­
mation will be kept confiden­
tial and 4 .  refusing to 
provide the information will 
not result in adverse treat­
ment. Employers may ask about 
handicaps only if they are 
trying to remedy past discrimi­
nation or expand opportunities 
for the handicapped through an 
affirmative action program. 
Inquiry or restriction of 
employment is permissible only 
where a Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification exists. (This 
Bona Fide exception is 
interpreted very narrowly by 
the courts and EEOC. ) The bur­
den of proof rests on the 
employer to prove that a Bona 
Fide Occupational Qualification 
does exist and that all members 
of the affected class are 
incapable of performing the 
job. 
General distinguishing physical 
characteristics such as scars, 
etc. 
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UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
forbids employers from asking 
job applicants general questions 
about whether they are handicapped 
or asking them about the nature 
and severity of their handicap. 
An employer must be prepared to 
prove that any physical and mental 
requirements for a job are 
due to "business necessity" and 
the safe performance of the job. 
Except in cases where undue 
hardship can be proven, 
employers must make "reasonable 
accommodations" for the physical 
and mental limitations of an 
employee or applicant. 
Sex of the applicant. Any other 
inquiry which would indicate 
sex. Sex is not a Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification 
because a job involves physical 
labor (such as lifting) beyond 
the capacity of some women nor 
csn employment be restricted 
just because the job is tradi­
tionally labeled "men 1 s work" or 
"women's work . "  Sex cannot be 
used as factor for determining 
whether or not an applicant 
will be satisfied in a par­
ticular job. 
Applicant's race. Color of 
applicant's skin, eyes , hair, 
etc. , or other questions directly 
or indirectly indicating race or 
color. Applicant's height or 
weight where it is not relative 
to job. 
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SUBJECT 
ADDRESS 
OR 
DURATION 
OF 
RESIDENCE 
BIRTH­
PLACE 
LAWFUL INQUIRIES 
Applicant's address. Inquiry 
into place and length of 
current and previous address. 
"How long a resident of this 
State of City?" 
"Can you after employment sub­
mit a birth certificate or 
other proof of u.s. 
Citizenship?" 
RELIGION An applicant may be advised 
concerning normal hours and 
days of work required by the 
job to avoid possible conflict 
with religious or other per­
sonal conviction. 
MILITARY 
PHOTO 
CITIZEN­
SHIP 
Type of education and 
experiences in service as it 
relates to a particular job. 
May be required after hiring 
for identifi·cation. 
"Are you a citizen of the 
United States?'' "If you are 
not a U . S .  citizen, have you 
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UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES 
Specific inquiry into foreign 
addresses which would indicate 
national origin. Names or rela­
tionship of persons with whom 
applicant resides. Whether 
applicant owns or rents home. 
Birthplace of applicant. 
Birthplace of applicant' s  
parents , spouse, or other rela­
tives. Requirement that appli­
cant submit a birth certificate, 
naturalization or baptismal 
record before employment. 
Any other inquiry into national 
origin. 
Applicant's religious denomina­
tion or affiliation , church, 
parish, pastor, or religious 
holidays observed. Applicants 
may not be told that any par­
ticular religious groups are 
required to work on their reli­
gious holidays. Any inquiry to 
indicate or identify religious 
denomination or customs. 
Type of discharge. 
Request photograph before 
hiring. Requirement that appli­
cant affix a photograph to his 
application. Request that 
applicant at his option , submit 
photograph. Requirement of photo­
graph after interview, but 
befor.e hiring. 
"Of what country are you a 
citizen?" Whether applicant or 
his parents or spouse are 
- -) 
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SUBJECT 
ANCESTRY 
OR 
NATIONAL 
ORIGIN 
EDUCATION 
LAWFUL -,INQUIRIES 
the legal right to remain per­
manently in the U.S.?" "Do 
you intend to remain per­
manently in the u.s.? " 
Statement that if hired, 
app�icant may be required to 
submit proof of citizenship. 
If not a citizen, are you pre­
vented from lawfully becoming 
employed because of visa or 
immigration status? 
Languages applicant reads, 
speaks, or writes fluently. 
Applicant's academic, 
vocational or professional 
education; school attended. 
Inquiry into language skills 
such as reading, speaking, and 
writing foreign languages. 
EXPERIENCE Applicant's work experience; 
including names and addresses 
of previous employers, dates 
of employment, reasons for 
leaving, salary history. 
Other countries visited. 
CONVICTION Inquiry into actual convic­
tions which relate reasonably 
to fitness to perform a par- 1 
ticular job. (A  conviction is 
a court ruling where the party 
is found guilty as charged. 
An arrest is merely the appre­
hending or detaining of the 
person to answer the alleged 
crime.) 
RELATIVES Names of applicant's relatives 
already employed by this com­
pany. Names and addresses of 
parents or guardians of minor 
applicants. 
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UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES 
naturalized or native born U.S. 
citizens. Date when applicant 
or parents or spouse acquired 
U.S. citizenship. Requirement 
that applicant produce his 
naturalization papers. Whether 
applicant's parents or spouse 
are citizens of the U.S. 
Inquiries into applicant's 
lineage ancestry, national ori­
gin, descent, birthplace or 
mother tongue. National origin 
of applicant' s parents or spouse. 
Any inquiry asking specifically 
the nationality, racial or reli­
gious affiliation of a school. 
Inquiry as to what is mother 
tongue or how foreign language 
ability was acquired. 
Any inquiry relating to arrests. 
Asking or checking into a person's 
arrest, court, or conviction 
record if not substantially 
related to functions and respon­
sibilities of the prospective 
employment. 
Name or address of any relative 
of adult applicant. 
) 
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SUBJECT LAWFUL INQUIRIES 
NOTICE IN Names of persons to be 
CASE OF notified in case of accident 
EMERGENCY or emergency. 
ORGANIZATION Inquiry into the organiza­
tions of which an applicant 
is a member providing the name 
or character of the organiza­
tion does not reveal the race, 
religion, color, or ancestry 
of the membership. 'What 
offices are held, if any? 
CREDIT None 
RATING 
REFERENCES By whom were you ref erred for 
a position here? Names of 
persons willing to provide 
professional and/or character 
references for applicant. 
MISC. Notice to applicants that any 
misstatements or omissions of 
material facts in the appli­
cation may be cause for 
dismissal. 
UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES 
Name and address of relatives to 
be notified in case of accident 
or emergency. 
"List all organizations, clubs, 
societies, and lodges to which 
you ·belong." The names of organ­
izations to which the applicant 
belongs if such information 
would indicate through character 
or name the race, religion, 
color, or ancestry of the 
membership. 
Any questions concerning credit 
rating, charge accounts, etc. 
Require the submission of a 
religious reference. Request 
reference from applicant's 
pastor. 
ANY INQUIRY IS FORBIDDEN WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY LISTED AMOUNG 
THE ABOVE, IS DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFORMATION AS TO RACE , COLOR, ANCESTRY, 
AGE, SEX, RELIGION, OR ARREST AND COURT RECORD UNLESS BASED UPON A BONA 
FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION. 
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2 .  The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines specifically provide that: 
A pre-employment inquiry may ask "Males, Females;" or "Mr . , 
Mrs. , Miss , "  provided that the inquiry is made in good faith 
for a non-discriminstory purpose, Any pre-employment inquiry 
in connection with prospective employment which expresses 
directly or indirectly any limitations, specifications or 
discriminations as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon 
a bona fide occupational qualification. (sec. 1604 . 7 )  
3 .  The EEOC ' s  Religious Discrimination Guidelines provide that 
preselection inquiries which determine an applicant' s availability 
have an exclusionary impact on people with certain religious 
practices; therefore, they violate Title VII unless the employer 
can show the inquiry (1)  Did not have ah exculsionary effect on 
its employees or prospective employees needing an accommodation 
for the same religious practice; or ( 2 )  was otherwise justified by 
business necessity. (sec. 1605 . 3 )  
4 .  The EEOC ' s  interpretation of the Age Discrimination Employment 
Act Guidelines specifies that while questions on an employment 
application from such as "Date of Birth" or "State Age" are not in 
themselves violations of the Act, they will be closely scrutinized 
to insure that the questions weren' t asked for a discriminant 
purpose. Employment applications cover all inquiries , including 
resumes, etc.. (sec. 16255 . 5 )  
C .  Arrest, Conviction and Military Discharge Records 
1 .  Refusal to hire a job applicant based on an arrest or criminal 
record must be based on business necessity. 
Employer who refused to hire black arrested (but not convicted) 14 
times violated Title VII in spite of general policy not to hire 
applicants with arrest records because blacks arrested 
substantially more than whites (disparate impact) and because 
there was no business necessity for the policy. (Gregory v.  
Litton Systems , Inc. , 3 1 6  F . Supp. 401 (Cal. 1970) ) .  But there 
was no Title VII violation when employer discharged a black 
employee convicted of theft and receiving stolen goods because he 
was employed in a position of access to the property of others 
which justified the hotel' s policy of requiring such persons to 
have a record reasonably free from property crime. (Richardson 
v.  Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F . Supp. (La. 197 1 ) )  
2 .  Courts are split on whether person can be denied employment based 
upon less than an honorable discharge. 
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D.  Educational Requirements: 
Must be related to job performance. (See Griggs v. Duke Power 
Company) 
E. Physical Fitness and Height and Weight Standards 
1 .  Must b e  demonstrably job related. 
Female police cadet in Knoxville Police Department dismissed for 
failing to pass a physical fitness test. Only three men and three 
women (counting the plaintiff) had ever failed the test; 
therefore, she did not carry burden of proof to establish 
disparate impact. In addition, court declared that test was 
related to physical traits needed in jo� as police officer. 
(Eison v. City of Knoxville , 570 F . Supp. 11 (E.D.Tenn. 1983) ) 
The U . S .  Supreme Court ruled that a state statute that limited the 
hiring of prison guards to persons 5 feet 2 inches tall and over 
and 1 20 or mor� pounds violated Title VII. Because 4 1% of women 
and only 1% of men would be disqualified by those standards that 
statute had a disparate impact on women and the state could not 
prove that standards were necessary for good job performance. 
(Dothard v .  Rawlinson , 97 S .Ct. 2720 (1977) ) 
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v. Employee Testing 
A .  Title VII Testing Standards 
1 .  Title VII authorizes the use o f  any professionally developed 
ability test, provided that such test, its administration or 
·actions upon the result is not designed, intended or used to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. (sec. 703 (h) ) 
a .  However, in Griggs v .  Duke Power, the U.S.  Supreme Court 
ruled that any test that has an adverse impact upon minority 
groups and women is illegal unless justified by business 
necessity. 
b .  Through the 60s and 70s the Griggs standard was virtually 
impossible to satisfy and most employment tests and other 
selection processes were found to have an adverse impact, thus 
were illegal. The Griggs standard is still extremely 
difficult to satisfy by all but the most sophisticated 
employers. The fact that an employer' s selection process 
meets a general standard or practice wili not satisfy the 
courts. 
B. The Employer's Testing Burden 
1 .  In a nutshell here is what an employer has to show: 
a .  The test or other employee selection process i s  necessary to 
the safe and efficient operation of the business (in this 
case, the government) .  
b. The test or other employee selection process is job related 
under very strict standards set by or resembling those 
established by professional associations, generally by an 
industrial psychologist or similar expert. 
c.  These standards require: 
( 1 )  Job Analysis--an examination of the actual tasks involved 
in the job in question--not the employers general 
business but the � itself. 
(2) Test and scoring scheme designed to predict the ability 
to perform those tasks. 
(3) VALIDATION--a demonstration that the employment test is 
related to success on the job, or a demonstration that 
the test represents an adequate sample of performance. 
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) d. Then, even if the selection system meets all the above tests 
it may still be held invalid if it had an adverse impact upon 
minority groups or women and there is a comparable valid 
system with less adverse impact. 
C .  Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selecting.Procedures (�978) 
1. In 1978, the EEOC, U.S. Civil Service Commission and the 
Department of Labor and Justice adopted the Uniform Guidelines. 
They are the standards by which those agencies will judge the 
employee selection processes of employers who are subject to EEOC 
investigations. 
2 .  The Uniform Guidelines apply to: 
a. All selection 
education for 
requirements, 
procedures: interviews, review of experience or 
application forms, work samples, physical 
and evaluations of performance; and 
b. All select'ion procedures used in reaching employment 
decisions: hiring, retention, promotion, transfer, demotion, 
dismissal, or referral. 
3 .  State and local government merit systems or laws requiring rank 
ordering of candidates and selection from a limited number of top 
candidates also fall under the Uniform Guidelines. 
(EEOC--Questions and Answers on Uniform Guidelines or Employee 
Selection Procedures) 
D .  Adverse Impact under The Uniform Guidelines. 
1 .  Adverse impact is defined by the EEOC as "a substantially 
different rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or other 
employment decision which works to the disadvantage of numbers of 
.a race, sex or ethnic group. " (Q and A, No. 10) 
2. The 4 /5' s or 80% rule. Agencies which have adopted the Uniform 
Guidelines will generally consider a selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic . group which is less than 4/5's or 80% of the 
.selection rate for a group with the highest selection rate as a substantially different rate of selection. 
a .  Example: 
Selection 
Applicants Hires Rate % Hired 
80 White 48 48/80 60% 1 /1 or 100% 
40 Black 12 12/40 30% 1 /2 or 50% 
of white 
rate 
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b. In theory the 4/5 rule is not a law; rather, it raises an 
inference of adverse impact which requires additional 
information and investigation to determine whether there is 
actually adverse impact. The size of the sample and other 
variables obviously influence the results in the application 
of the 4/5 or 80% rule. 
·c. Groups are compared to measure adverse impact. 
(1) Selection rates for males and females. 
(2) Selection rates for race and ethnic groups are compared 
with the selection rate of the race or ethnic group with 
the highest selection rate. 
i .  Blacks 
ii. American Indians 
iii. Asians 
iv. " Hispanics 
v.  Whites 
vi. Totals 
3 .  "Bottom Line" Concept 
a. 
b. 
c. 
If the 4/5 or 80% standard is met for the total selection 
process, then the government agencies which have adopted the 
Uniform Guidelines generally do not focus on the individual 
components in the selection process for the purpose of 
deciding which employers to prosecute for discriminatory 
employment practices; they look at the "bottom line. " 
However, the practice of looking at the bottom line is only a 
policy of prosecutorial discretion. The EEOC also has 
significant administrative powers including investigation of 
complaints, finding of reasonable cause/no cause, and 
"voluntary" conciliation which make up a substantial portion 
of the EEOC's work . Iri the exercise of its administrative 
authority, the EEOC can focus on individual components in the 
selection process, 
"Bottom line" concept in action, 
Fifty-four percent (54%) of the black candidates and 80% of 
the white candidates passed the test for a supervisory 
position. Four of the blacks who failed the test sued 
claiming that the test had an adverse impact upon blacks. 
However , the employer promoted 22.9% of the black candidates 
and only 13. 5% of the white candidates from the eligibility 
list created by the exam. The bottom line was that the test 
generated no adverse impact in the total selection process. 
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However, ·in this case the Supreme Court ruled that the bottom 
line concept does not offer a justification to discriminate 
against some persons on the premise that other persons of the 
same race were hired. (Connecticut v.  Teal, 454 u.s. 813 
(1982) ) .  
E .  Test Validation 
1 .  I n  the EEOC's own words in the Uniform Guidelines, "validation has 
become highly technical and complex, and yet is constantly 
changing as a set of concepts in industrial psychology . "  That is 
the understatement of the year. Test validation is impossible to 
understand without substantial training in industrial psychology 
or a similar field. 
2 .  There are three validation concepts: 
a. Content validity--A selection procedure which samples 
significan.t parts of a job (such as a typing test for a 
typist) . The weight assigned to each sample must be in 
proportion to the demand for that skill on the actual job. 
b. Construct Validity--Involves identifying the psychological 
traits (the construct) necessary for successful performance on 
the job, and a demonstration that the selection procedure 
measures the presence and degree of construct (such as a test 
of leadership ability) . 
c.  Criterion-related validity--A selection procedure is justified 
by a statistical relationship between scores on the test or 
other selection procedures and measures a job performance of a 
sample of workers. 
3 .  The Uniform Guidelines go into great detail about each validation 
concept, but the information is absolutely useless to the average 
person who makes a hiring qecision, including many personnel 
officers 
4 .  However, one way to avoid the validation trap is to simply not 
test prospective employees; especially where it can reasonably be 
calculated that the test will have an adverse impact upon minority 
groups, including women. 
5. Test validation in action 
a .  A Boston firefighters test consisting of 15 questions covering 
current events , spelling, vocabulary , arithmetic, and 75 
questions taken from firefighters' manual was declared invalid 
by the U . S .  Court of Appeals. The 15 questions had nothing to 
do with firefighting and the 75 questions rewarded 
memorization of fire fighting terminology rather than 
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measuring traits related to actual fire fighter's performance, 
according to the court. A validation study had been done on 
the test, which found a correlation between the test 
performance and job performance , but not enough to satisfy the 
court. (Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371  F . Supp. 
507 (D. Mass. 1 974)) 
· 
b .  A paper and pencil test consisting of 120 questions was given 
to firefighters and police officers in Birmingham, Alabama. 
Applicants who passed the test were placed on eligibility 
lists and ranked according to their scores. The pass rate for 
blacks was substantially lower than that for whites. The 
Court held that use of a test for ranking purposes is 
justified only if there is evidence that those with higher 
test scores do better on the job than do those with lower test 
scores. The city tried to justify the test by using criterion 
related studies to show that those with higher test scores 
made better academy grades, and had better efficiency ratings 
by thei.r supervisors ,  etc. The Court declared that the 
validation' studies showed that higher test scores did not 
predict better performance. (Ensley Branch v. Seibels, 6 1 6  
F . Supp. 8 1 2  (1980) ) 
F .  'Pre-Employment Drug Testing 
1 .  Law in this area is in the development stage and is confused and 
unclear. 
a .  For the most part drug testing in employment law deals with 
the drug testing of individuals who are already employed as 
opposed to applicants for employment. However, probably basi­
cally the same standards the courts use to judge post­
employment drug tests programs applies to pre-employment drug 
test programs. There is an important difference between 
employees and applicants for employment; the latter do not 
have a property interest in the job. Whether that difference 
is significant as far as pre-employment drug testing is con­
cerned is not clear. 
As to the drug testing of present employees, it has generally 
been held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure applies to drug testing , and 
that absent reasonable suspicion of drug usage on the job, 
such tests are unconstitutional. In Lovvorn v. City of 
Chattanooga , Docket No . CIV-1-86-389 , November 1 3 ,  1986,  the 
U . S .  District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
struck down the drug testing program used to detect drug use 
in the Chattanoog Fire Department as "overly intrusive and 
constitutionally infirm. "  The Court found no reasonable cause 
for suspicion of drug use in the Fire Department supporting 
the drug testing. The City, declared the Court, 
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has not pointed to any objective facts concerning 
deficient job performance or physical or mental 
deficiencies on the part of its firefighters, either 
in general or with respect to specific personnel, 
which might lead to reasonable suspicion upon which 
the test could be based. 
In National Treasury Employees Union v.  William Von Raab, 
Docket No. 86-3522 , the U . S .  District Court for ·the Eastern 
District of Louisiana struck down a drug testing plan applied 
to employees who sought promotion to certain sensitive drug 
enforcement jobs. There was no reasonable or probable cause 
justifying the test, according to the court; rather, the plan 
"uses a dragnet approach of testing all workers who seek pro­
motion into so called covered positions [and is] repugnant to 
the United States Constitution. "  
A significant number of other drug testing cases , including 
those inv�lving public safety personnel ,  have found such tests 
unconstitutional on the same or similar grounds. 
b.  Some cases have upheld drug testing programs for government 
employees in sensitive or dangerous jobs. In National 
Association of Air Traffic Specialists v.  Dole, Docket No. 
A-87-073,  March 2 7 ,  1987,  the U.S.  District Court for the 
District . of Alaska upheld an FAA drug testing program required 
as a part of an annual medical examination of for flight ser­
vice specialists. While the test was a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, declared the court , it was a 
search justified in the public' s  interest in air safety. The 
random as well as systematic drug testing of prison guards was 
upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in in Mc 
Donnell v.  Hunter , CA 8 ,  No. 85-10 1 9 ,  1/12/87 , 40 Cr'L""2321 on 
the grounds that the state had an overriding interest in the 
security of its prisoners. 
However, even among those cases which have upheld drug testing 
programs for public safety personnel or other employees who 
hold dangerous jobs, most require at least some reasonable 
suspicion of drug use on the part of the individual employee 
(a serious accident on the part of a school bus driver in one 
case) or some pattern of conduct on the part of individuals in 
the agency which denotes drug use. 
2 .  There i s  a possibility that pre-employment drug testing is per­
missible as a part of a physical examination, at least for appli­
cants of jobs as public safety personnel and others who hold 
hazardous occupations. 
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a. Notice that drug testing is required 
Notice to job applicants that they are required to undergo 
drug testing may help such a test survive scruitny. In Capua 
v .  City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) the 
u.s. District Court, in striking down a drug testng program 
for police officers and firefighters criticized the plan, in 
part , because nothing in the initial employment agreement or 
any othe.r civil service rule gave notice to the officers that 
they might be required to submit to a drug test after their 
employment began. It is doubtful whether the court would have 
approved the plan even without that deficiency; however, 
notice that drug testing is part of pre employment screening 
at least removes that obstacle to the approval of a drug 
testing plan. 
4 .  Accuracy of the drug test 
A major problem in this area is the questionable accuracy of some 
drug tests. · Several courts have struck down employment decisions 
based on drug drug tests either in whole or in part because of 
questions about the accuracy of the tests in question. 
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VI. Discriminatory Job Placement 
A.  Hiring a Person Is Not Good Enough 
1 .  Opportunities for promotion and training cannot be denied to 
employees based on race, color, sex, .religion or national origin. 
A black janitor employed by a Tennessee Aerospace enginee�ing firm 
"bid" unsuccessfully over a ten year period for promotion into 
vacant jobs and placement in job trainee programs , including jobs 
as truck driver and storekeeper. He was either held not to be 
qualified or told that a better qualified person was sel�cted. 
The U . S .  District Court held that although the engineering firm's 
promotion and training practices were nondiscriminatory on their 
face , the practices fell more harshly on black wage earners. The 
evidence: 
29 of 40 janitors were black ; 
2 of 2 jani.tor leadmen were black; 
29 of 6 3  laborers were black ; 
2 of 2 trash laborers were black; 
0 of 15 chief storekeepers were black; 
2 of 44 storekeepers were black; 
45 of 45 machinists were white; 
174 of 174 outside machinists were white. 
Except for electrician trainee positions, 217 of 
218  electrical group employees were white. 
(Kennedy v.  ARO , Inc. , 447 F .  Supp. 1090 
( E . D .  Tenn. 1977) ) 
This case illustrates the courts will not limit their focus on the 
treatment of the person complaining of discrimination but will 
review the overall hiring and placement practices of an organiza­
tion and will use statistical evidence to find evidence of 
employment discrimination. 
B .  Discriminatory Placement of Minority Groups in "Dirty" Jobs. 
A black man applied for job in Tennessee hospital and asked for 
clerical job. He had had experience at Austin Peay State University 
as a typist and clerk . After he applied for the job at the hospital, 
he worked three months at Arnold Engineering as a clerk. He was 
discharged there for unsatisfactory work performance, but his 
supervisor told the personnel director at the hospital that he was one 
of the best typists he had ever seen. 
The hospital hired the black man as a dishwasher. His performance as 
a dishwasher was good , and he was transferred to housekeeping 
department where he cleaned rooms . At the end of his first year, he 
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got an excellent job performance rating. He asked for transfer to job 
as a clerk in dietary department. He passed the typing test but a 
white woman was hired for the job. He was told his job performance 
was unsatisfactory based on disciplinary reports that he claimed he 
had never seen. He filed a complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights 
Commission which entered into a conciliation agreement with the 
hospital under which the hospital promised to promote the black man to 
the first position for which he was qualified. 
No one ever contacted him about another' job in the hospital. He 
noticed a job opening for a clerk in the business office but was told 
that the job might not even be filled. It was later filled by a white 
woman. The supervisor in the business off ice refused to accept him as 
an employee. 
Court held that the black man was the victim of discrimination. The 
evidence in addition to his placement in the dishwashing job: no 
black had ever held a clerical job in the hospital. 
But an interesting aspect of this case is that the hospital argued 
that the black man was denied a promotion because of poor job 
performance. He had been written up for various infractions ,  
including tardiness (what the other infractions were i s  not clear in 
the case) . However, the hospital was faced with its own excellent 
performance rating of the man. (Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial 
Hospital, 574 F .  Supp. 224 (M .D. Tenn, 1983 ) )  
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VII. Sex Discrimination 
A .  EEOC's Sex Discrimination Guidelines. 
It is an unlawful employment practice under the EEOC Sex 
Discrimination Guidelines to: 
1 .  Classify or advertise a job as "male" or "female"; 
2 .  Maintain separate seniority lists or lines of progression based on 
sex, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualifications ( BFOQ) 
for the job; 
3 .  Limit or restrict the employment of mar,ied women but not of 
married men; 
4 .  Provide different fringe benef its--including medical, hospital and 
life insurance., retirement, and merit pay--in a manner which has 
an adverse impact on women , such as limiting benefits to the "head 
of the household" or "principal wsge earner"; 
5 .  Make benefits available for the wives and families of male 
employees but not for the husbands and families of female 
employees; 
6 .  Exclude female applicants from employment consideration or female 
employees from employment opportunities because of pregnancy , or 
discriminate in any other manner, including the award of benefits, 
on the basis of pregnancy; 
7 .  Refuse to hire or otherwise provide employment opportunities for 
women because of the alleged preferences of co-workers , clients , 
customers or the employer--except where sex is a BFOQ; and 
8 .  It is also an unlawful practice for the employer to adhere to 
state "protective" laws for women which are in conflict with and 
superseded by Title VII. 
B. Intentional Pretextual Discrimination 
Storey v .  City of Sparta Police Department, 667 F.Supp 1 164 
(M.D .Tenn. 1987) 
In August, 1984 a 36 year old woman with an associate degree in 
administration of justice applied for a job as a police officer in the · Sparta Police Department. A week later she was interviewed by the 
chief of police who told her that there were two vacancies and that 
she was the best qualified applicant for the job. He also told her 
that some of the members of the board of mayor and aldermen might have 
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an "attitude problem" about hiring a female police officer. He further 
told her that he might be able to hire her as early as the mi.ddle of 
October , 1984. However, on October 3 ,  1984 he told her that he could 
not hire her because she was a woman, and that women were not minori­
ties for the purposes of affirmative action. According to testimony 
in the case, the city was concered about ·responding to a HUD recommen­
dation that its UDAG eligibility be decertified because of a minority 
under-representation in its workforce. She told the city administra­
tor that she wanted to speak to the city council, but the city admim­
istrator advised her not attend the October 4 meeting of the council. 
While she did not attend that meeting , she attended the October 14 
meeting where she presented her qualifications. The chief of police 
recommended a black male for the job as police officer, but apparently 
the council rejected him because he had earlier quit the same job. 
One aldermen suggested to the board that the city hire some minori­
ties and employ them long enough to obtain the federal grant money 
and then dismiss them during their probationary period ! The council 
decided to advertise the vacanct police officer position and at its 
November meeting to hire an officer from among the three most 
qualified candidates selected by the chief of police and the city 
administrator. 
On October 2 3 ,  1984 Storey filed a complaint of sexual and racial 
discrimination with the EEOC (she also claimed to be an Indian) . On 
October 3 1 ,  1984 she was interviewed by both the chief of police and 
the city administrator. During that interview she was told that a 
female police officer would be a first for Sparta, and was asked how 
her husband would feel about her riding with male officers. 
Several other applications for the job were received before the 
November 1 meeting of the city council, but no other applicants were 
interviewed for the job. However, at the November 1 meeting of the 
city council , no mention was made of hiring a new police officer, and 
the chief of police was never asked to report on his search for 
qualified applicants for the job and he made no attempt to address the 
council on the subject even though he had the right to bring businees 
before the council. 
Both the chief of police testified that there was a manpower shortage 
in the police department at the time he and the city administrator 
interviewed Storey. During the next sixteen months overtime hours 
were paid to Sparta police officers for every pay period except three, 
but no one was hired as a police officer until February 20 , 1986 .  
The police department also lost another two or three police officers, 
either permanently or temporarily , during that period. 
When the chief of police office became vacant in January , 1986 Storey 
applied for the job, noting on the application that she was also 
interested in a job as a police officer. In its March 6 ,  1 986 
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meeting ,  the city council , on the recommendation of the city admi­
nistrator, decided to hire a temporary police officer. However, 
the council , for the first time , established the requirement that 
the police officer had to be certified, and declared that no pre­
ference would be given to the temporary officer for full-time 
employment. A female was given the temporary job; she worked until 
August , 1986 and was reemployeed in December, 1986. 
A few days after it hired its first female officer (as a temporary 
employee) the city council discussed hiring another police officer and 
at its March 20 , 1986 meeting , the council decided to hire a permanent 
police officer. This time no mention was made of hiring only a cert­
ified officer. Storey was notified by mail of the vacancy and she 
telephoned her interest in the job. An experienced male police 
officer was hired in April, and another experienced male officer was 
hired in September ,  1986. Storey was never - offered a job as a police 
officer. 
The U . S .  District Court held that Storey was the victim of inten­
tional sexual discrimination. The Court declared that the Mc Donnell 
Douglas Corporation v. Green test, adapted to sex discrimination, 
requires that for a female to make a prims f acie case of discrimina­
tion,_ she has to show that 
l .  She i s  a female. 
2 .  She applied for and was qualified for the job. 
3 .  Despite her qualifications , she was rejected for the job. 
4 .  After her rejection, the postion remained open, and the 
employer continued to seek other applicants from persons of 
the applicant' s  qualifications. 
The City of Sparta conceded the first two compenents to Storey, but 
contested the last two components on the grounds that Storey could not 
have been rejected because there was no vacancy in the job as police 
officer when she interviewed for the job in October,  1984. However, 
the court declared that a vacancy did exist. As evidence that the 
vacancy existed the Court pointed to:" the decision of the city coun­
cil that a vacancy existed; the advertisement of the job and the 
acceptance of applicants; the knowledge of the chief of police , com­
municated to the city council, that the police department was 
understaffed; the unappropriated fund balance in the city budget 
which was apparently set aside for the hiring of police officers; 
and the overtime worked by Sparta police officers during the eighteen 
months a police officer was not hired (which the chief of police 
testified could have funded an additional officer) . 
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The Court got around the fourth component of the McDonnell Douglas test 
by declaring that the test was a variable one depending on the cir­
cumstances and that each element did not have to be satisfied in every 
case. An employer , said the court, could not pay overtime as a 
subterfuge to discriminate. "Title VII �mposes no obligation on the 
employer to hire anyone unless the refusal is motivated by discrimi­
nation. "  (Emphasis the Court' s) The Court announced that 
• • •  once an employer makes a conscious, deliberate decision 
to fill a position, advertises the vacancy , and accepts 
applications , it will be hard put to claim that a legitimate 
business judgment was thereafter made to eliminate the 
position, especially when the only significant intervening 
event is the appearance of a qualified . minority applicant. 
The Court did not stop there. It declared that even if Storey had 
not been able to make a prima facie case under the Mc Donnell Douglas 
test she would still not have been out of court because she presented 
direct evidence. of discrimination , and the Mc Donnell Douglas test 
applies when only indirect evidence of discrimination is available, 
reasoned the Court. Storey' s direct evidence was the statement of the 
chief of police that he wouldn't hire her because she was a woman and 
that there might be an attitude problem on the part of the city coun­
cil towards a female police officer, the questions about her husband's 
attitude towards her riding around with male officers, comments made by 
the city council , and the hiring of a female police officer only on a 
temporary basis (which the Court also found represented illegal reta­
liation against Storey for her filing of a complaint with the EEOC ) . 
The City' s explanation that its solicitation of applications in 
October, 1984 was an effort to attract racial minorities to preserve 
its federal grants was not believed by the Court, which declared that 
police off iceres were sought because the police department was 
understaffed and overworked. "The plaintiff was rejected, not because 
of what she wasn' t--a black--but, rather, ·because of what she was--a 
woman, concluded the Court. 
c .  Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
1 .  The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines interpret the BFOQ 
exception very narrowly. It will not find a BFOQ in the following 
situations: 
a.  The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on the 
assumption of the comparative employment characteristics of 
women in general. For example, the assumption that the 
turnover rate among women is higher than men. 
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b. The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped 
characteristics of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for 
example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate 
equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive selling 
techniques. 
C• The refusal to hire an individual because of the preference of 
co-workers, the employer, clients or customers, except where 
it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or 
genuineness--an actor or actress, for example. ( Sec. 1604.2) 
2. Proving that sex is a BFOQ is an almost impossible task. To 
establish a BFOQ an employer has to show that : 
a .  The essence of the business operation would be undermined by 
not having members of one sex exclusively; 
b .  There are no alternatives that have a less adverse impact. 
(Dothard ,/. Rawlinson, 9 7  S .Ct. 2720 (1977 ) )  
(1)  In Dothard a state regulation prohibiting females from 
holding "contact" guard positions in an all-male maximum 
security prison was held by the U . S .  Supreme Court to be 
a BFOQ. The Court reasoned that Title VII rights must be 
balanced against the possibility of a disruption in the 
prison system, and that the balancing test in this case 
weighed in favor of the regulation because, "In a prison 
system where violence is the order of the day, where 
inmate access to guards is facilitated by dormitory 
living arrangements, where every institution is 
understaffed, and where a substantial portion of the 
inmate population is composed of sex offenders, there are 
few visible deterents to inmate assaults on women 
custodians. "  
(2) But in Gunther v .  Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 6 1 2  
F . 2d, 107 9 ,  (1980 ) ,  the Court of Ap,Peals in a similar 
case ruled in favor of a female guard who sought a 
promotion from Corrections Officer I to Corrections 
Officer II. The CO Is did not perform many of the 
prisoner contact duties performed by the CO !Is. The 
plaintiff conceded that inmates right to privacy would 
suffer is she performed strip searches and surveillance 
of prison showers and toilets performed by the CO !Is, and 
that if the prison gave her limited duties someone else 
would have to perform the duties she didn't perform, 
However, the Court ruled that not only must the state 
show that, "the hiring of women would undermine the 
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') essence of the prison administration, "  the state must 
"also demonstrate it could not reasonably rearrange job 
responsibilities in a way to minimize the clash between 
privacy interests of the inmates and the 
nondiscrimination principle of Title VII. "  The Court also 
relied on proof that there were CO !Is in a maximum 
security male institution iri the state, and that more 
male COils had performed limited, single job functions 
for, several years without undermining the institution. 
D .  Sex-plus Discrimination 
1 .  Sex-plus discrimination is when the employer penalizes members of 
one sex because of their sex plus another factor or condition. 
(The most common example is refusing to , hire women with 
children--a sex plus children condition. 
a .  The u. R. Supreme Court has ruled that an employer' s policy of 
hiring men with pre-school children while refusing to hire 
women with pre-school children is illegal sex discrimination. 
However, an interesting aspect of that case is that the Court 
also said that such a policy would be legally justified if the 
employer could show that the child care obligations makes 
women substantially poorer workers. (Phillips v.  Martin 
Marietta Corp. ,  400 u.s. 592 (1969 ) ) .  
(1)  Making such a showing would be a nearly impossible burden 
to carry for virtually any employer. 
(2) But an employer can impose legitimate job requirements 
which apply to both sexes. 
A female cable splicer was required to travel extensively 
as a part of her job. She objected to the travel because 
she had trouble arranging for child care. Her employer 
permitted her to reschedule job assignments and even 
offered her other jobs not requiring travel, but which 
paid considerably less. In the face of her continual 
objections and refusals to travel, she was eventually 
fired. The Court of Appeals held that the travel 
requirement was a legitimate one and that her employer 
did not discriminate against her for making her travel 
even if it interfered with her child care 
responsibilities. In addition, the travel assignments 
were made on the basis of a seniority system which 
insulated the employers action against a discrimination 
claim under Title VII. (Giocolchea v .  Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, __ F .2d _ (9th Cir. 
1984) 
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b. Marital status: 
The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines provide that an 
employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of 
married women and which is not applicable to married men is 
sex discrimination. ( Sec. 1604. 4) 
D.  Height, Weight and Physical Agility Requirements 
l .  Height, weight and physical agility requirements that have an 
adverse impact on women must be job related. 
2 .  
In a landmark U . S .  Supreme Court case, Alabama's minimum 
height and weight requirements for prison guards were stuck 
down. A 22 year old woman with a college degree was denied a 
job as a prison guard in a maximum security prison because she 
did not meet the minimum physical standards of 5'2" in height 
and 1 20 lbs. in weight. The Supreme Court found that while 
those standards would respectively exclude 1 . 28% and 2 . 35% of 
men, they would respectively exclude 3 3 . 29 and 22. 29% of 
women--a disparate impact. The state could not prove that the 
standards were job-related; to do so it would have had to show 
that there was a correlation between the height and weight 
requirement and strength. The standards were a violation of 
Title VII. (However, in the same case, a regulation 
prohibiting women from job assignments to "contact positions" 
_!!! job related , thus a BFOQ, because 22% of the men in the 
maximum security prison were sex offenders where the presence 
of women would be a threat to the basic control of the 
prison. )  ( Dothard v.  Rawlinson , 9 7  S .Ct 2720 (1977) ) 
Like all tests , physical agility tests must be "validated" if they 
have an adverse impact upon women. 
E .  Sex Stereotyping 
l .  Two women had worked for Hertz Corporation in Memphis for several 
years as rental representatives. They unsuccessfully applied for 
promotion to station manager once in 1 978, twice in 1 979 , and once 
in 1 9 8 1 .  In response to their suit, Hertz alleged that the women 
were guilty of various kinds of misconduct including imperfect 
accounting , rudeness and hopping over the counter. The District 
Court's opening remarks indicate the direction this case went: 
"This case presented to the Court a disgusting saga of the ongoing 
activities in employer-employee relations in the Hertz Corporation 
in Memphis, Tennessee. The Court finds that the men were promoted 
into station manager jobs because a cadre of male management 
preferred men in management positions at Hertz and disallowed the 
promotion of women. " Testimony in this case was that the city 
manager (for Hertz) stated on various occasions that women 
shouldn't be managers because: 
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1 .  They couldn't g o  away for training. 
2 .  Women couldn't follow irate male customers into the 
restroom. 
3.  A woman's place is  in  the kitchen. 
The hopping over the counter accusation against one female rental 
representative particularly caught the eye of the Court , which 
found that she locked herself out of the counter area by accident 
and when what appeared to be a stranger came up to the counter the 
woman, rather than make him wait for service until she could 
locate keys, said "to Hell with it" and jumped over the counter. 
But , said the Court , "The stranger turned out to be none other 
than a stuffy and pretexteous regional manager of the Hertz 
Corporation. He testified he was ' shocked' to see such behavior, 
which is ridiculous in the light of Hertz Corporation' s national 
advertising campaign featuring o. J. Simpson hopping over suit 
cases and obst�cles in airports. "  The city manager (for Hertz) 
could not defend hiring male managers over females except to say 
that they came to him highly recommended by high male officers of 
Hertz. 
This case was also characterized by improper sexual remarks. The 
) Court said it was the order of the day for male employees to 
address questions about sexual activities and preferences to 
women, such as "Did you get any this weekend?" The Court issued 
an injunction against such comments. (Morgan v. Hertz 
Corporation, 542 F. Supp. 123 (W .D .Tenn. 1981)) 
2 .  A black female was appointed to two year term a s  principal o f  a 
middle school in Knoxville City School System. At the end of two 
year term, she was reassigned as a classroom teacher. She sought 
and was rejected for several administrative positions. Her suit 
alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of race as 
well as sex. However, the Court found that under Superintendent 
Hoffmeister blacks with proper credentials had "fared rather 
well , "  Fifty percent of qualified blacks held administrative or 
supervisory positions in 1981 and 75% of them held supervisory , 
administrative ,  or principalship positions in 1977-79 school 
years. But the Court found that she had been discriminated 
against on the basis of sex. The plaintiff had alleged that the 
Superintendent of schools had told her on several occasions that 
he liked to appoint men to principal staff positions because 
children needed a male image and did a better job maintaining 
control, etc. , and the Superintendent did not deny that he made 
those statements. The Court also pointed out that no female had 
ever been a middle school principal until . the time pertinent to 
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and elementary school principalships. In addition, the Court 
considered the following statistics related to the sex 
distribution of principals in the Knoxville City School system: 
1976--54 principals , 1 6  females 
14 asst. principals , 5 females 
1 979--48 principals, 9 females 
1 8  asst. principals , 5 females 
(Williams v. · Hoffmeister, 520 F . Supp. 521 ( E.D.  Tenn, 1981) ) 
F .  Pregnancy and Childbirth 
1 .  Title VII , as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which 
became law on October 3 1 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  prohibits discrimination against 
women on the basis of pregnancy . 
a.  Basic provisions: An employer: 
(1 ) cannot refuse to hire , promote, or to terminate a woman 
because of pregnancy; 
(2) must treat pregnancy the same as any other disability 
under an employee benefit plan; 
(3) cannot compel a woman to take a pregnancy leave at some 
arbitrary point in her pregnancy; and 
(4) must provide the same reinstatement rights to pregnant 
women, credit of previous service and accrual of 
seniority and benefits , that it provides to other 
employees who experience a disability. 
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VIII. Age Discrimination 
A .  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
The ADEA prohibits the following employment practices with respect to 
persons over the age of 40 (except that policemen, firemen and prison 
guards may be hired and retired in accordance with local rules and 
retirement plans until 1994 , provided that the limits cannot be any 
more restictive than those in place on March 3 ,  1983 . )  
1 .  To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge or to otherwise 
discriminate against an individual based on age, with respect to 
compensation ,  terms , conditions or privileges of employment; 
2. To limit, segregate or classify an employee, in a way that would 
deprive the employee of job opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect the employee' s  status based on age; 
3 .  To indicate · ariy "preference , limitation ,  specification, or 
discrimination" based on age in notices or advertisements for 
employment; and 
4. To reduce the wage rate of an employee to comply with the Act. 
B .  The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception 
1 .  The ADEA contains as BFOQ exception; that is, discrimination is 
permitted if the employer can show that age ia a BFOQ. However, 
the EEOC Age Discrimination Guidelines specifies that: 
a .  The exception shall be narrowly construed. 
b .  An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving 
that: 
(1 ) The age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of 
the business, and either 
(2) That substantially all individuals excluded from the job 
involved are in fact disqualified , or 
(3) That some of the individuals so excluded possess a 
disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by 
reference to ages. 
2 .  Needless to say, it is extremely difficult to prove a BFOQ either 
to the satisfaction of the EEOC or the Courts. Most BFOQ cases 
involve aircraft crew positions, firemen ,  and police officers. 
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3 .  Two landmark u.s. Supreme Court decisions decided before the 
1986 amendment to the ADEA which changed the class of person pro­
tected from those between the ages of 40 and 70 to those over the 
age of 40 had already punched a large hole in many age limitations 
imposed by state and local governments on those persons under the 
age of 7 0 .  Those cases are still current a s  to the BFOQ cefense, 
except that now they must be read to apply to the hiring and 
retirement limitations placed on persons at any age over 40, 
including over the age of 70. 
Criswell v. Western Airlines, Docket No. 83-1545 (Decided June 17, 
1985); and Johnson et. al, v. Ma or and Cit Council of 
Baltimore, et, al. '· Docket No. 84-518 Decided June 1 t:-T985) 
a.  In Criswell, pilots employed by Western Airlines reaching 
their 60th birthdays appli°ed for reassignment as flight 
engineers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement which 
permitted cockpit crew members to "bid" for flight engineer 
jobs on the basis of seniority. FAA regulations prohibit 
pilots and copilots who have reached the age of 60 on 
commercial flights, but there are no like prohibitions for 
flight engineers. However, Western Airlines also prohibited 
fight engineers from serving beyond the age of 60.  The pilots 
sued Western Airlines contending that the mandatory retirement 
age of 60 for flight engineers violated the ADEA. Western 
Airlines raised the defense that the mandatory retirement age 
was a BFOQ. The jury at the District Court level rendered a 
verdict for the pilots which was upheld by the Court of 
Appeals and the U . S .  Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court in analyzing the proof in the case 
acknowledged that there was conflicting evidence over the, 
"actual capabilities of persons over 60 and the ability to 
detect disease or a precipitous decline in their faculties," 
but there is no doubt about which side of the proof the Court 
came down. It pointed out that, "flight engineers have rarely 
been a contributing cause or factor in commercial aircraft 
' accidents' or ' incidents,' "  that other airlines did not have 
an over 60 rule for flight engineers, that flight engineers do 
not handle the controls of the aircraft except in an 
emergency, and that both the FAA and the airlines had been 
able to deal with health problems of pilots on an individual 
basis to the extent that some who were grounded by alcoholism 
and cardiovascular problems hsd been recertified to fly as 
pilots and that some pilots who had been unable to pass the 
medical test for a pilot had been certified as flight 
engineers, 
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The Supreme Court established the standard in ADEA cases in 
the following language: 
Under the Act, employers are to evaluate employees 
between the ages of 40 and 70 on their merits and not 
their age. In the BFOQ def�nse, Congress provided a 
limited exception to this general principle but 
required that employers validate any discrimination as 
' reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business. '  It might well be ' rational' to 
require mandatory retirement at any age less than 70,  
but that result would not comply with Congress' 
direction that employers must justify the· rationale for 
the age chose. Unless an employer can establish a 
substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all 
employees above an age lack the qualifications required 
for the position, the age selected for mandatory 
retirement less than 70 must be an age at which it is 
. highly impractical for the employer to insure by 
individual testing that its employees will have the 
. .  necessary qualifications for the job • .  
Look carefully at the standard. An employer who wants to 
establish age as a BFOQ must show : 
( 1 )  That there is a substantial basis for believing that all 
or nearly all employees above an age lack the 
qualifications required for t.he position, 2!. 
(2) The age selected for mandatory retirement below 70 [ since 
the 1986 ADEA amendment, at any age] must be an age at 
which it is highly impractical for the employer to insure 
by individual testing that its employees will have the 
necessary qualifications for the job. 
b. In Johnson, six firefig'bters sued in a U . S .  district court 
challenging a Baltimore municipal code provision mandatory 
retirement for firefighters under 70 years of age. Under the 
City's retirement system five of the firefighters had to 
retire at 60 and one at 5 5 .  The City raised age as a BFOQ for 
firemen. The District Court ruled in favor of the firemen, 
declaring that the city had shown neither, "that there is a 
factual basis for [ it) to believe that all or substantially 
all Baltimore City firefighters between the ages of 60 and 65 , 
other than officers would be unable to perform their jobs 
safely and efficiently • • •  nor that it is impossible or 
impractical to deal with firefighters between 60 and 65 on an 
individualized basis. "  
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However , the Court of Appeals held that the City was entitled 
to the BFOQ defense as a matter of law whether or not it could 
prove that age was a BFOQ. In doing so, it relied on the 
Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v .  Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226 
( 1983) in which the court said that the ADEA allows a state 
the discretion to impose a mandatory retirement age "against a 
reasonable federal standard. " Because the federal government 
had established a retirement age of 55 for federal 
firefighters, reasoned the Caur.t of Appeals , the City was not 
required ta make a factual showing at trial as ta its need for 
the mandatory retirement age. 
The retirement age far federal firefighters survived a 1978 
amendment ta the ADEA which eliminated most federal age limits 
an employment, but it left untouched those relative to 
firefighters, air traffic controllers , law enforcement 
officers, Foreign Service and the CIA. 
The Supreme Court held that the "reasonable federal standard" 
ta which it referred in EEOC v.  Wyoming "is the standard 
supplied by the ADEA itself--that is, whether the age limit is 
a bona fide occupational qualification. "  The Court went on ta 
say that the mere fact that same federal firefighters are 
required ta cease work at age 55 does not provide an absolute 
defense ta an ADEA action challenging local age limits far 
firefighters. Nothing in the civil service history preserving 
age limits an federal firefighters suggest a congressional 
determination that age 55 is a BFOQ far federal firefighters 
far ADEA purposes; rather , it indicates a congressional 
determination ta maintain a youthful work force in same 
federal occupations, including firefighters. Therefore, 
concluded the Court "this civil service provision does not 
articulate a ·BFOQ far firefighters [and] its presence in the 
United States Cade is not relevant ta the question of a BFOQ 
for firefighters , [ and] it ·would be an error for a court, 
faced with a challenge under the ADEA ta an age limit for 
firefighters, to five any weight, much less conclusive weight, 
ta the federal retirement provision. "  
The standards far BFOQ age limitations under the ADEA are the 
standards announced in Western Airlines ,  declared the Court. 
4 .  Criswell raises the question o f  whether many of the laws, 
ordinances and policies of state and local governments which 
establish age limits for v�riaus occupations, including those 
traditionally covered by such limitations , such as policemen and 
firemen , will stand up to challenge under the ADEA . If Criswell 
does nothing else, it provides additional notice to employers, 
bath public and private , that the standard of proof required ta 
establish a BFOQ is extremely high. 
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Johnson makes it clear that reliance on the federal retirement age 
to support a BFOQ defense for firemen and by extension policemen, 
cannot be given any consideration by a court. 
Factors Other Than Age 
1 .  An employer may make employment decisions that adversely affect 
person 40--70 if the decisions are made on factors other than age. 
a .  The EEOC Age Discrimination Guidelines provide that 
{ l )  When an employer uses age as a limit on employment 
opportunities, it cannot defend the practice on the 
grounds that it is justified by factors other than age. 
{ 2 )  When an employment practice has an adverse impact upon 
persons between 40 and 70, it can be justified only as a 
business necessity. 
{ 3 )  The burden is on the employer who raises the "factors 
other than age" defense of an employment practice to show 
that factors other than age actually exist. 
{ 4 )  Difference in treatment of employees on the grounds that 
it is more expensive to employ older persons may not be 
used as a factor other than age defense for the 
employment practice. {Sec. 1625 . 8 )  
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A .  Reasonable Accommodation. 
Title VII requires an employer to 
1 .  Make reasonable accommodation for a current or prospective 
employees religious observance or practice, unless 
2 .  Such accommodation would impose undue hardship o n  the employers 
business. 
B .  Accommodation Requires Only Minimal Costs 
1 .  An employer need not bear more than minimal costs in accommodating 
religious beliefs or practices. 
Case Examples 
Transworld Airlines v.  Hardison , 9 7  S .Ct. 2264 ( 1 977) is the 
landmark case in this area. An employer belonged to the Worldwide 
Church of God, which observes a Saturday Sabbath. But when he 
chose to move to a new job in the company , he was placed on the 
bottom of the seniority list consistent with a collective 
bargaining agreement, so that he was unable to avoid some Saturday 
work. Numerous attempts were made by the company to accommodate 
his belief in a Saturday Sabbath by unsuccessfully attempting to 
get volunteers to substitute for him. When he refused to show up 
for work several Saturdays in a row, he was fired. He argued that 
under the reasonable accommodation provision, TWA was required to 
ignore the seniority rights of other employees under the 
collective bargaining agreement and assign them to work in his 
place , or that other employees should have been offered a premium 
to work in his place , or that he should be allowed to work a four 
day week. The Supreme Court rejected his argument and ruled that 
TWA had satisfied Title VII when it attempted without success to 
arrange a job swap with other employees. Further, an employee 
need not bear more than "diminimus costs" nor violate seniority 
rights of co-workers in accommodating the religious beliefs and 
practices of its employees. The seniority system itself 
represented a significant concession to both the religious and 
secular needs of all its employees , said the Court. 
(This case represented a setback for the EEOC which expected 
extensive accommodation by an employer under early EEOC Religious 
Discrimination Guidelines. )  
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c .  Accommodation Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination Guidelines, 
An employer's refusal to accommodate is justified only when the 
employer can demonstrate that a hardship would result from each 
available alternative method of accommodation. The Guidelitii!'S""list 
the following alternatives for accommodating religious practices which 
conflict with a work schedule: 
1 .  Voluntary substitutes and swaps. However, the Guidelines are not 
satisfied with leaving it up to the employees to arrange the swap, 
the employer must "facilitate" the swaps. Some of the suggested 
means of facilitation are: 
a .  Publicize policies regarding accommodation and voluntary 
substitutions; 
b. Promote an atmosphere in which substitutions are favorable 
regarded; and 
c Provide. bulletin board, central file or other means for 
matching volunteer substitutes with position for which 
substitutes are needed. 
2 .  Flexible scheduling of work , such as: 
a.  flexible arrival and departure times; 
b. floating or optional holidays; 
c .  flexible work breaks; 
d .  use of lunch time in exchange for early departure; 
e .  staggered work hours; and 
f .  permitting employee to make up lost time due to observance of 
religious practices. 
3 .  Lateral transfers and change of job assignments (Sec. 1605 . 2 )  
D.  Employer Hardship Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination 
Guidelines 
1 .  Costs: The Guidelines provide that the "minimum costs" standards 
declared in Hardison will be measured with consideration of the 
"size and operating cost of the employer and the number of 
individuals who will in fact require a particular accommodation. "  
However, the Guidelines go on to say that the EEOC will "assume 
that the ·infrequent payment of premium wages for a substitute or 
the payment of premium wages while a more permanent accommodation 
is being sought are costs which an employer can be required to 
bear as a means of providing a reasonable accommodation. " 
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2 .  Seniority rights: The Guidelines provide that voluntary 
substitutes or swaps do not constitute an undue hardship where 
those arrangements do not violate a bona fide seniority system. 
(Sec. 1605 . 2 )  
E .  Selection Procedures Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination 
Guidelines. 
1 .  Tests and other selection procedures must be scheduled to 
accommodate religious practices if they do not create undue 
hardships. 
2 .  Pre-hiring inquiries concerning the availability of an applicant 
to work during certain hours is prohibited unless the employer can 
show that they: 
a .  Did not have an exclusionary effect on present o r  prospective 
employees needing an accommodation; 
b, Were justtfied as a business necessity. 
3 .  The EEOC will infer that the need for an accommodation influenced 
a decision to reject an applicant when: 
a .  The employer makes an inquiry into the applicant's 
availability prior to making an offer for employment without 
having a business necessity justification; 
b. After the employer has determined that the applicant made an 
accommodation , the employer rejects a qualified applicant. 
The burden is then on the employer to demonstrate that the 
qualified applicant was rejected for factors other than the 
need for religious accommodation or that accommodation without 
undue hardship was not possible. (Sec. 1605 . 3 )  
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X. National Origin Discrimination (Title VII and the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986) 
A. Definition 
1 .  Title VII does not define the term n4tional origin, but the EEOC 
National Origin Discrimination Guidelines defines it as: 
including, but not limited to , the denial of equal employment 
opportunity because of an individual ' s ,  or his or her 
ancestors' place of origin; or because an individual has the 
physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national 
origin group. 
2 .  But the EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines go on to 
. provide that the EEOC . "will examine with particular concern" alle­
gations of the denial of equal employment opportunity for reasons 
which are grou�ded in national origin considerations, such as: 
a. Marriage to or association with persons of a national origin 
group; 
b .  Membership in, or association with an organization identifying 
with or seeking to promote the interests of national origin 
groups; 
c.  Attendance or participation in schools churches ,  temples or 
mosques , generally used by persons of a national origin 
groups; and 
d. Because an individual' s name or spouse' s name is associated 
with a national origin group. (Sec. 1 606 . l )  
3 .  Standard of proof of discrimination 
a.  The EEOC will apply gerteral Title VII principals such as 
disparate treatment and adverse impact to national origin 
discrimination. (Sec. 1 606 . 1 )  
b. The IRCA requires proof of "discriminatory intent" in 
employment discrimination cases brought under that law. 
However, the U . S .  Justice Department rules announce that for 
its purposes direct or circumstancial evidence , including 
statistical evidence. will permitted to show that an employer 
is guilty of a "pattern or practice of knowing and intentional 
discrimination. " (Emphasis mine) The courts will probably 
follow the same or a similar standard. 
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4 .  The EEOC has ·already informed employers that in its view the IRCA 
does not permit discrimination against employees of any ethnic 
background, and has cautioned employers that to avoid violations 
of both the IRCA and Title VII it should watch their employment 
practices in several areas: 
a .  Hiring practices based on place of origin, physical, cultural 
or linguistic characteristics common to certain national 
origin groups 
b. Discrimination against persons 
1
based upon accent or speech 
manners peculiar to certain national origin groups 
c.  Harrassment based upon national origin, such as racial slurs 
d.  Requirements that employees speak only English, and English 
fluency requirements 
e .  Height o r  weight requirements 
f .  Employment tests 
g. Citizenship requirements or preferences (What about the 
"preference" of U . S .  citizens permitted under the IRCA? )  
B .  BFOQ Exceptions. 
National origin may be a BFOQ but the exception, 
Title VII exceptions will be strictly construed. 
Discrimination Guidelines , Sec. 1606 . 4 )  
C .  Discrimination Against Aliens 
as with all other 
(National Origin 
1 .  The EEOC Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination provide that 
where citizenship requirements have the purpose or effect of 
discriminating against an �ndividual on the basis of national 
origin, they are prohibited by Title VII. 
2. However, in Espinoza v.  Farah Manufacturing Company, 4 1 4  U . S .  86 
( 1973) ) ,  the u.s. Supreme Court made it clear the Title VII does 
not protect aliens against discr'imination. In this case, the 
court ruled that a female, Mexican job applicant. had been rejected 
not because of he.r national origin , but because she was an alien. 
(But the Supreme Court has also extended aliens some protection 
from discrimination in public employment through the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the u.s. Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. 
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CAUTION: Whfle Title VII may not protect aliens against discrimi­
nation , the !RCA of 1 986 does precisely that. 
3 .  Exception for jobs involving "political functions" 
a .  State laws excluding aliens from . significant elective and 
non-elective jobs have been upheld by the U . S .  Supreme Court 
on the basis of their "political function"--jobs whose 
performance goes to the heart of representative government. 
Such jobs have been held to include public school teachers , 
police officers , and probation officers. 
Three permanent resident aliens applied for jobs as probation 
officers with the Los Angeles County Probation Department but 
were rejected on the basis of a California law that required 
such officers to be U . S .  citizens. In upholding the legality 
of their rejection, the Supreme Court reviewed past rulings of 
upholding laws excluding non-u.s. citizens from holding jobs 
as police officers and school teachers. Because probation 
officers also had the power to exercise coercive power and 
control over people , U . S .  citizenship is an appropriate 
limitation on those who exercise it. (Cabell v. 
Chavez-Salido, 102 S .Ct. 7 35 ( 1 982) ) 
b. Tennessee restricts the job as police officer (T .C.A. 
38-8-106) and public school teacher (T .C.A. 49-5-202) to u.s. 
citizens. 
c.  But public jobs involving duties that do uot require the 
exercise of policy making responsibility or broad discretion 
"that requires the routine exercise of authority over 
individuals" probably do not meet the political function test 
and cannot be restricted to U . S .  citizens. (Bernol v.  
Fainter , _ u .• s.  ( 1 984) 
D.  Employee Selection Procedures 
1 .  The EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines provide that 
the Uniform Guidelines for Emplo ee Selection apply to an 
employer's selection procedures. Sec • .  1 60 1 . 6) 
2 .  Height and weight requirements 
a .  The EEOC National Origin Guidelines say t�at the employer is 
required to evaluate height and weight selection procedures 
for adverse impact regardless of whether the total selection 
process has an adverse impact; they are an exception to the 
"bottom line" concept. 
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b. The same standards and statistical methods that apply to 
establishing sex discrimination on the basis of height and 
weight requirements apply to establishing national origin 
discrimination on the basis of height and weight requirements. 
E .  English Language Requirements 
1 .  Applied all the time: The EEOC will presume that such a rule 
violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it. (National 
Origin Discrimination Guidelines, Sec. 1 606 . 7 )  
2 .  Applied only at certain times: If an employer believes it has a 
business necessity for a part-time English only rule , the employer 
is required to so notify the employee both of the existence of the 
rule, and when it applies. (National Origin Discrimination 
Guidelines , Sec. 1606 . 7 )  
3 .  English proficiency may be justified on the basis of business 
necessity. 
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